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Abstract
We explore an investment game where industry sunk costs provide anincentive for a firm to
be a follower into the market as opposedto a leader. For some parameter values, every firm
could have adominant strategy to wait, even though immediate entry is sociallyoptimal − this
is a like prisoners' dilemma. In equilibrium, afirm is more likely to have a dominant strategy
to wait with anincrease in the number of potential entrants. Finally, theequilibrium can
display an entry cascade.
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Firm entry is an important source of new products and, as a result, can signiﬁcantly enhance
social welfare (Geroski 1995, p. 436). When making the decision about when to enter a
market a ﬁrm will consider the beneﬁts of entering early and facing less competition, with
waiting and entering the market at a later date, possibly after the technology or the market
has been developed. Empirically, second-movers often do better than the ﬁrms that enter a
market ﬁrst (Tellis and Golder 1996). This paper examines the implications for the timing
of ﬁrm entry into a market in which there is a second-mover advantage.
A second-mover advantage could arise in many diﬀerent situations. In Hoppe (2000), a
second-mover advantage arises in a duopoly model of technology adoption due to uncertainty
and decreasing adoption costs over time. Here, on the other hand, the second-mover advan-
tage is due to a free-rider eﬀect. As an example, the development of a new market often
involves sunk costs. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm may need to invest heavily in advertising in order to
generate knowledge and stimulate interest in a new product. Importantly, it can be the case
that a signiﬁcant component of these costs are industry sunk costs, as opposed to ﬁrm-speciﬁc
sunk costs. Similarly, investment in research and development can aid potential competi-
tors when intellectual property rights are poorly protected (possibly internationally).1 The
same situation could arise if a government implements narrow (as opposed to broad) patent
protection, allowing second-movers to imitate innovations easily. As a modelling tool, this
paper incorporates industry sunk costs into a strategic model of investing as a leader or as
a follower.
The basics of the model are as follows. Before any ﬁrm can exploit a new proﬁtable market
opportunity, a certain amount of resources needs to be expended on either advertising, to
inform the public of the new product, or on non-patented research. This cost is borne by
ﬁrms that initially enter the market, but this expenditure is a public good for all potential
entrants in that, once the investment has been sunk, all ﬁrms can beneﬁt of this investment
if they choose to enter the market. The question then arises for each ﬁrm as to when they
should enter the market: early entry allows them to beneﬁt with fewer competitors but may
mean they incur some of the industry set-up costs; delayed entry may allow a ﬁrm to avoid
the set-up costs but they also forgo some beneﬁts by not participating in the market.
Several interesting results arise out of the model. First, consider the case when there are
two potential entry periods. This means a ﬁrm can enter immediately or it can sit out of
the market for one period and enter in the next period. A ﬁrm cannot enter the market if
it decided not to enter in both the ﬁrst two periods. If sunk costs are suﬃciently high, each
ﬁrm has a dominant strategy to wait and not enter the market until the second potential
investment period. This result is a type of prisoners’ dilemma; welfare is reduced by the
delay in entry but no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate. Given the free-rider problem here,
a delay in investment is more likely to occur with an increase in the number of potential
entrants. This is similar to the ﬁndings of Kaplan et al (2003).2
1For example, see Stegemann (2000), Ostergard (2000) and Levy (2000) for a discussion of international
protection of intellectual property and copyright. In another context, Roberts (2000) argued that patents
provided limited protection to internet companies and their technologies.
2See Kaplan et al (2003) Corollary 1.
1Second, as as future returns are discounted, if the number of potential investment periods
is increased (from two periods), the beneﬁt of waiting until the last opportunity to enter
the market, evaluated at the start of the game, is reduced. When the potential investment
horizon is suﬃciently long, in the symmetric equilibrium the ﬁrms will adopt a mixed strategy
between investing and not investing in this period - this is a coordination game. Note, this
game diﬀers from the usual coordination game somewhat; it is, instead, similar to what
Binmore (1992) described as an Australian Battle of the Sexes.
Third, once one ﬁrm has entered the market, all other potential ﬁrms enter as soon as
possible. This creates an entry cascade. A similar cascade occurs in Zhang (1997) when ﬁrms
have diﬀering private information regarding an investment opportunity and in Fudenberg and
Tirole (1985), for certain parameter values, when the cost of adopting a new technology is
decreasing over time. The model presented generates an investment cascade without private
information and decreasing investment costs.
Last, the application considered here is an entry decision with industry sunk costs. The
model also applies to other scenarios in which the ﬁrms must make an irreversible investment
(or decision) and there is a second-mover advantage, including price-setting games (Hamilton
and Slutsky 1990).
2 n-ﬁrm investment game
Consider the following set-up. There are n ≥ 2 ﬁrms that are potential entrants to some new
market. The net beneﬁt from entering is B per period, to be shared amongst all ﬁrms that
have entered.3 Once entry has occurred there are an inﬁnite number of production periods;
all ﬁrms discount future returns by δ per period. There are some costs C that are incurred
in the ﬁrst period in which entry occurs, where C is shared among all the ﬁrms that enter
in that initial period. Entry (by at least one ﬁrm) is eﬃcient in that B
1−δ > C.4
First, consider the situation when there are only two potential entry periods, so that
a ﬁrm can enter in the ﬁrst period, enter in the second period, or decide to not enter the
market at all.5 Note, in this model there is an exogenously determined deadline for entry.
This could come about if the proﬁtable opportunity dissipates after a certain point in time
because, for example, of the invention of a substitute product or technology.6 Let us show
that it is always proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to enter the market in the second period, if it has not
already done so. Consider when no ﬁrm entered the market in the ﬁrst period. If m ≥ 1
ﬁrms enter in the second period, the payoﬀ to any individual ﬁrm from entering, evaluated
at the start of the game, is δB
m(1−δ) − δ C
m. As B
(1−δ) > C entry is proﬁtable for every ﬁrm. If
at least one ﬁrm entered in the ﬁrst period the payoﬀ to a ﬁrm from entering in the second
period, again evaluated at the start of the two potential investment periods, is δB
m(1−δ) if a
3B could represent, for example, proﬁts in the industry that the ﬁrms share with perfect collusion.
4Note that, given there are no ﬁrm speciﬁc sunk costs, the welfare outcome in this model is the same
regardless of the number of ﬁrms producing, provided at least one ﬁrm is in the market.
5This two-period investment game has a similar structure to the bank run game analyzed by Gibbons
(1992, pp. 73-75) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Chamley’s (2001) model of exchange rate speculation.
6Making the deadline (number of potential investment periods) endogenous is beyond the scope of the
paper and is left for future research.
2total of m ﬁrms entered over both periods. Clearly entry is proﬁtable in this case. As a
consequence, if a ﬁrm has not already done so it will enter the market in the ﬁnal potential
investment period.
Second, using the result above, now consider a ﬁrm’s decision as to whether or not to
enter the market in the ﬁrst period. To examine this issue we consider: (a) the payoﬀs from
entry when the ﬁrm is the only entrant; and (b) when they share entry in the ﬁrst period.
If n−1 ﬁrms decide to wait, the beneﬁt to the other ﬁrm from entering in the ﬁrst period
is




If the ﬁrm does not enter in the ﬁrst period, all of the ﬁrms will enter in the second











)C > B. (3)
Conversely, the ﬁrm will enter in the ﬁrst period, given all the other ﬁrms do not enter,
if B > (1 − δ
n)C.
Now consider the entry decision of one ﬁrm when k of the other ﬁrms decide to enter in
the ﬁrst potential investment period, where n − 1 > k > 0, and n − k − 1 decide to wait. If




















Comparing these two equations one can infer that the beneﬁt of waiting is bigger iﬀ
C > B. (6)
From both these cases, the ﬁrm has a dominant strategy to invest immediately if B > C.
It is worth noting that this strategy is optimal in this case regardless of the number of
ﬁrms. When C > B > C(1 − δ
n), the ﬁrm are in a coordination game - each ﬁrm prefers
to wait if k other ﬁrms enter but invest if no other ﬁrms invest, where n > k > 0. In this
coordination game there are many asymmetric equilibria. For example, ﬁrm 1 adopts the
strategy to invest immediately (and to do so in any period). All other ﬁrms will adopt the
strategy to wait in every period until either another ﬁrm has already invested, or invest if
it is the last period of the game. Asymmetric equilibria have the disadvantage that they
3do not specify why one ﬁrm enters and the other ﬁrms wait. Our focus, in response, is on
symmetric equilibrium in which a ﬁrm will adopt a mixed strategy.
If B < C(1 − δ
n), the ﬁrm has a dominant strategy to wait and not invest in the ﬁrst
period.
Now let us consider when B = C and B = C(1 − δ
n). First, when B = C, if a ﬁrm
enters and the other (n − 1) ﬁrms wait in the ﬁrst period, the entering ﬁrm will receive a
payoﬀ of B −C + δB
n(1−δ) = δB
n(1−δ). If the ﬁrm waits in this case its payoﬀ will be δB
n(1−δ) − δC
n .
Given that the payoﬀ from entering is greater than the payoﬀ from waiting, the ﬁrm will
opt to enter immediately. If, on the other hand, k ﬁrms enter in the ﬁrst period, a ﬁrm will
be indiﬀerent between entering and waiting as the payoﬀs are the same - δB
n(1−δ). Given this
indiﬀerence, many asymmetric equilibria exist in which at least one ﬁrm enters, and all the
other ﬁrms can either enter, wait or mix between both. However, when B = C there is only
one symmetric equilibrium; in the symmetric equilibrium all ﬁrms invest immediately.
Second, consider when B = C(1 − δ
n). If all of the other (n − 1) ﬁrms wait, a ﬁrm
will be indiﬀerent between entering and waiting as payoﬀ in equation 1 equals the payoﬀ
in equation 2. If at least one other ﬁrm enters immediately, a ﬁrm will have a dominant
strategy to wait as the payoﬀ given by equation 4 is less than the payoﬀ given by equation 5.
In a similar manner to the case above, there are many asymmetric equilibria in which (n−1)
ﬁrms wait and the last ﬁrm can either enter, wait or mix between both. There is, however,
only one symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which all ﬁrms will wait in the ﬁrst
period.
This discussion is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Consider the entry game with two potential investment (entry) periods. If
B ≥ C all ﬁrms invest immediately in the ﬁrst period in the symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE). If C > B > C(1 − δ
n) each ﬁrm will mix between entering immediately
and waiting to enter in the second period in the symmetric SPE. Finally, if B ≤ C(1 − δ
n),
in the symmetric SPE all ﬁrms will wait and only enter the market in the second period.
If B ≤ C(1 − δ
n) the ﬁrms are in a prisoners’ dilemma: the welfare of every ﬁrm would
be improved if they all could commit to invest immediately but each ﬁrm has a dominant
strategy to wait, reducing total surplus.
Now consider the eﬀect of a change in n. Note that C(1 − δ
n) is increasing in n; this
increases the parameter range for which B ≤ C(1 − δ
n). Thus an increase in n makes it
more likely that every ﬁrm delays entry. This result arises because increasing the num-
ber of potential entrants accentuates the free-rider problem. Corollary 1 summarizes this
discussion.
Corollary 1. An increase in the number of potential entrants (n) increases the interval for
which all ﬁrms have a dominant strategy to wait.
For arguments sake, assume that B ≤ C(1 − δ
n), so that the ﬁrms are in a prisoners’
dilemma in the two-period investment game. Now consider the optimal strategies of the ﬁrms
when there are three potential investment periods. In this case, the payoﬀ from waiting for a
ﬁrm if no one invests in the ﬁrst period is the two-period payoﬀ discounted by an additional
δ - the extra period of delay reduces the beneﬁt of waiting. Reducing the beneﬁt from
4waiting makes immediate entry more attractive. If this reduction in the beneﬁt from waiting
is suﬃcient, a ﬁrm will no longer have a dominant strategy to wait. Instead they will adopt
a mixed strategy between investing and waiting. Proposition 2 summarizes this discussion.
This point is further illustrated in Example 1.
Proposition 2. Assume B ≤ C(1− δ
n), so that the ﬁrms are in a prisoners’ dilemma in the
two-period game. As the number of potential investment periods, j, is increased, for some
j > 2 the ﬁrms will no longer have a dominant strategy to wait.
Proof. The outcome in the two-period game is as above - all ﬁrms have a dominant
strategy to wait and will receive a payoﬀ of δ
n( B
1−δ − C). If j = 3, the payoﬀs to the ﬁrms
are the same as in the two-period game, except for the payoﬀ if all ﬁrms opted to wait. This
payoﬀ will be the two-period payoﬀ, discounted by δ. Provided B+ δB
n(1−δ) −C < δ2
n ( B
1−δ −C)
each ﬁrm will still have a dominant strategy to wait. There will be some j > 2 for which
B + δB
n(1−δ) − C > δ(j−1)
n ( B
1−δ − C); with this number of periods, each ﬁrm no longer has a
dominant strategy to wait. The ﬁrms are then in a coordination game. 
Example 1. This example shows that when B ≤ C(1 − δ
n) for two investment periods, as
the potential investment horizon is extended the optimal strategy switches from a prison-
ers’ dilemma game to a coordination game when there are a suﬃcient number of potential
investment periods.
Let C = 5, B = 3, δ = 0.9. Further, assume that there are three potential ﬁrms. Figure 1
shows the normal-form game when there are two potential investment periods. In the ﬁgure,
I refers to the strategy to invest immediately and W indicates that the ﬁrm does not invest
in that period. The left-hand payoﬀ matrix refers to when ﬁrm 3 invests immediately and
the right-hand panel relates to when she does not invest in that immediate period (she plays
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Figure 1: A prisoners’ dilemma game for three ﬁrms and two potential investment periods.
As there are two periods, the choice for each ﬁrm is to invest immediately or invest in
the second and ﬁnal investment period. Each ﬁrm has a dominant strategy to wait and
only invest in the second period, as in a prisoners’ dilemma game. This follows because
B ≤ C(1 − δ
n) when there are two potential investment periods.
If the potential investment horizon is extended so that there are three possible investment
periods, the only payoﬀ that is changed from the above ﬁgure is when all three ﬁrms opt
to wait (W) in the ﬁrst period. In this case, the game proceeds to the next period; given
that there are just two potential investment periods left the game exactly resembles the two-
period game. As a result, the payoﬀ to each ﬁrm when they all decide to wait in the ﬁrst
5period is that payoﬀ from the two-period game (7.5) discounted by the additional period,
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Figure 2: A prisoners’ dilemma game for three ﬁrms in a three-period investment game.
Here, due to the additional discounting, the payoﬀ from waiting is not as great as the
payoﬀ to investing for a ﬁrm if the other two ﬁrms do not invest immediately (7 > 6.75).
Each ﬁrm no longer has a dominant strategy to wait, and will adopt a mixed strategy in
the symmetric equilibrium. In this mixed strategy equilibrium each ﬁrm invests with a
probability of approximately 0.107. 
There are several further noteworthy points that arise out of the model. Note that once
(at least) one ﬁrm has entered and borne the sunk costs, all other ﬁrms will enter as soon
as possible, creating an entry cascade. A similar entry dynamic occurs when ﬁrms have
a dominant strategy to wait until the ﬁnal period. This suggests that entry cascades can
occur when there are industry sunk costs or when there is poor protection of intellectual
property, as well as in the presence of asymmetric information (Zhang 1997) and decreasing
investment costs (Fudenberg and Tirole 1985).
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